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Abstract 
It is difficult to estimate the ultimate effects of an economic crisis that is far from over. Nevertheless, international 
collaboration during this sharp economic recession has been far more sustained and stable than the course of 
international cooperation during two previous economic downturns that matched or exceeded its severity:  the Great 
Depression of 1929-33 and the global recession of 1981-82.  In both of these earlier cases, economic nationalism 
grew, and existing modes of cooperation either collapsed or were threatened by unilateralism and corrosive forms of 
regionalism. The persistence global institutions for economic cooperation in the wake of the current economic crisis 
bears explanation given this history. 
Among the explanations considered for this departure from previous responses to economic crisis are 
(a) The character of economic globalization.  Although global economic integration may have promoted diffusion of 
the economic crisis; it may also have shifted the incentives of national governments toward more cooperative 
responses and rendered economic nationalism and decoupling less attractive. 
(b) Constraints imposed by international economic cooperation.  Contemporary international institutions, following 
the model of Bretton Woods, have combined international constraints with policies to support national economic 
expansion:  policies of economic stimulus, most notably, have been forged as part of international collaborative 
bargains, not in opposition to those cooperative modalities. 
(c) The major developing and transitional economies, which led the way in decoupling from the international 
economy during the Great Depression and bore the brunt of earlier economic crises, have been able to weather the 
current economic crisis better than many industrialized countries.  
Each of these possible explanations for the current record of global economic cooperation also points to a 
shortcoming in current global economic governance that future reforms must address: 
(a) A more fully globalized economy means that national policies, particularly those of larger economies, will have a 
more immediate and potentially negative effect on other economies and their well-being.  Closer scrutiny of national 
policies and new means for exercising such scrutiny will be demanded. 
(b) Although the current mechanisms of global economic cooperation have allowed considerable flexibility for 
national policymakers in confronting the crisis, the weakness of international constraints also permitted persistent 
macroeconomic imbalances and lax regulatory policies that produced the crisis. 
(c) Award of effective decision-making authority in global governance to key emerging economies, such as China, 
India, and Brazil, has hardly begun.   Given the hard stance in defense of national sovereignty taken by these 
governments, their growing role has ambiguous implications for future strengthening of global institutions. 
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The ultimate effects of the current global economic crisis are difficult to estimate:  not only is the crisis 
far from over, its impact will be felt long after a global economic recovery is in place.  Nevertheless, 
international collaboration during this sharp economic recession has been more sustained and stable than 
the course of international cooperation during two previous economic downturns that matched or 
exceeded its severity:  the Great Depression of 1929-33 and the global recession of 1981-82.  In both of 
those earlier cases, economic nationalism grew, and existing modes of cooperation either collapsed or 
were threatened by unilateralism and corrosive forms of regionalism.  In the present crisis, although 
concrete steps for deepening global economic cooperation have not been agreed, discussion of such 
measures continues in multilateral settings, such as the recent Group of 20 Summit in Pittsburgh.  This 
apparent stability in economic cooperation may not last, but these initial promising signs merit 
explanation, particularly when compared with the record of earlier economic crises. 
One economic cataclysm has shaped our views of global governance for more than a half-century:  the 
Great Depression.  The demise of the gold standard, rapid descent into competitive depreciations, beggar-
thy-neighbor protectionism and trade discrimination, and extensive imposition of controls on cross-border 
transactions—those features of the post-Depression international system were prominent drivers of 
institution-building during World War II and in the postwar decades.  Vivid memories of the destructive 
potential of economic nationalism and unilateralism, however, did not produce a template for rapid 
economic liberalization or tight international constraints on national policies, however.  The Bretton 
Woods order incorporated a new monetary system centered on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), public financing of economic development through 
the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral agencies, and longstanding capital controls.  The new 
order was global governance designed for governments that were responsive to the demands of their 
publics for economic prosperity and security.  It did not mark, or even promote, an immediate return to a 
globalized world. 
The steep economic recession of the early 1980s, which succeeded two oil shocks and inflation that 
was unprecedented in the post-1945 era, did not rival the collapse of international economic exchange and 
international cooperation induced in earlier decades of depression and war.  Nevertheless, the early 1980s 
were a threatening period for the global trading system, as “Fortress Europe” seemed intent on staving off 
international competition, and the United States embarked on “aggressive unilateralism” during the 
Reagan Administration.  The United States and its allies in free-market orthodoxy (particularly the United 
Kingdom) were deeply skeptical of international institutional collaboration, even though the International 
Monetary Fund played a key role in managing the international debt crisis of these years.  Japan, at that 
time aspiring to become “Number 1,” did not seem politically interested or economically equipped to play 
a leading role in strengthening global or regional governance.  
Economic crisis in the early 1980s ultimately revived many of the instruments of international 
collaboration, and the world economy emerged from its last, pre-globalization recession without the turn 
to closure that had marked the Great Depression.  Little, if any, lasting innovation in global governance 
occurred, however, as the world economy entered into an era of wider and deeper economic integration.  
The current financial and economic crisis has demonstrated that those forces of global economic 
integration have outstripped the capacities of global governance.  A decade ago, predictions of the gradual 
demise of the nation-state and growing power awarded to supranational institutions were prevalent.  
Increasing economic integration did not produce either outcome, however.  National governance (and 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Forum
57 Miles Kahler /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  55 – 64 
governments) proved to be, not only resilient, but also essential to the success of global governance.  
Rather than a zero-sum transfer of political authority from national to supranational institutions, the two 
were more often complementary.   
Economic globalization since 1990 has not uniformly produced global institutions with greater 
authority delegated by national governments.  Although the WTO’s creation in 1995 signaled a 
strengthening of the global trade regime, other globalized sectors did not match this move to greater 
supranational authority.  During the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund expanded its advisory role in 
those economies transitioning from socialism to capitalism.  Its role in monetary and financial 
surveillance, particularly with regard to the major national economies, remained minimal.  Financial 
markets outstripped the capacities of the IMF and other governance mechanisms, such as the Financial 
Stability Forum and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).   In another rapidly expanding 
dimension of globalization, foreign direct investment, efforts to create a global investment regime under 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) failed; bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) remained the core element in international governance.   Finally, although labor migration 
hardly equaled the scale of cross-border movements during the pre-1914 era of globalization, cross-border 
movement of labor became an important component of the new globalized economy.  Remittances from 
migrant labor became an essential contributor to economic development in many poor economies.  Yet 
policies governing migration remained entirely within the scope of national authorities and, occasionally, 
bilateral understandings.  No global migration regime existed; no proposal for such a regime was on the 
international agenda.   
Rather than the earlier concern over runaway and unaccountable global institutions, a more telling 
question in the first decade of the new century was “why so little supranationalism?”, given the extent of 
global economic integration.i
 
  Regional institution-building presented a similar mixed picture.  European 
integration appeared to move forward with the adoption of the Euro as a common currency by (some) 
members of the European Union in 2002.  At the same time, European electorates repeatedly 
demonstrated their skepticism regarding deeper political integration.  In the most economically dynamic 
region of the global economy, Asia, modest steps were made toward greater regional collaboration, 
particularly in the Chiang Mai Initiative and in bilateral and sub-regional trade agreements.  In parallel 
with the global trend, however, regional institutions failed to match the growth and integration of the 
Asia-Pacific regional economy. 
The current economic crisis:  persistent cooperation; modest innovation 
When the global economic crisis began in 2008-2009, global governance—the authority vested in 
global intergovernmental institutions--had not kept up with rapid integration in the world economy.  
Markets were regarded as stable and market actors as stabilizing; self-regulation or limited regulation 
became the new norm.  Given the thinness of global governance in the face of a transformed international 
economy, one might have predicted that a global economic and financial crisis would produce a 
governance failure as great as that of the early 1930s.  Instead, cooperative behavior dominated during a 
period of deep economic distress and uncertainty.  Efforts at strengthening existing global institutions and 
modest institutional innovations were both promoted in the face of the crisis. 
The greatest shift took place in the role awarded the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Only a few 
years ago, many feared (or hoped) that the IMF had become obsolete in a world of expanding private 
capital flows.  Resistance to IMF prescriptions after the Asian financial crisis explained in part the rapid 
buildup of reserves by Asian and other developing countries.  The same member countries bridled at their 
under-representation in the IMF’s governance.  Countries that had long been on the IMF client list, such 
as Argentina, hastened to end IMF programs.  The loss of clients in a period of apparent financial calm 
produced unfamiliar budget constraints at the IMF and forced a reduction in staff.   
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This cyclical downturn in the IMF role in global governance has quickly reversed during the current 
economic crisis.  The IMF has resumed its familiar role of providing financial assistance to countries that 
have been excluded from the troubled financial markets.ii  In addition, the IMF instituted a new lending 
facility meant to be attractive to large, credit-worthy economies beset by global financial turmoil, the 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL).  Steps were taken for an overdue revision of IMF quotas to reflect the 
growing importance of developing economies, a commitment reinforced at the Pittsburgh Summit of the 
Group of 20 in September 2009.   (A similar, though smaller, shift in voting power and quotas was agreed 
for the World Bank.) Governments of the largest emerging economies found additional leverage in a 
commitment to increase the resources of the IMF.  Some of that increase would derive from the first 
issuance of bonds by the IMF, bonds that large developing economies, such as China, would purchase.   
This prospective shift in the balance of influence within the IMF was predicted to strengthen its 
representative character and its global legitimacy. iii
The IMF was also awarded new roles by the Group of 20:  as the provider of “candid, even-handed, 
and balanced analysis” for the new Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth agreed at 
the Pittsburgh Summit.  Although commitments under the Framework would not be binding and the 
principal enforcement mechanism would be peer pressure, the IMF was, for the first time, offered a 
process and a role that might allow it to fulfill its surveillance role for the major economies.   
  
If the revival of the IMF was one signal of sustained global economic collaboration, the new role 
awarded to the Group of 20 (G-20) was a further sign that innovation rather than restoration would also 
mark the post-crisis economic order.  The G-20—nineteen prominent industrialized and developing 
economies plus the European Union—originated after the Asian financial crisis indicated the need for a 
global economic forum that extended beyond the industrialized country club of the Group of 7.  The G-20 
had not assumed a central place in global economic governance before the current economic crisis.  As 
economic and financial crises deepened, however, an emergency meeting of the G-20 in November 2008 
signaled a greater willingness by the industrialized countries to include key emerging economies in global 
economic decision-making.  That new role was confirmed at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, in 
which the G-20 was proclaimed the new locus for discussions of global economic policy.  Little sign was 
given, however, of any increased institutionalization for the G-20; even the basis for membership in the 
group remained imprecise.  As noted, the Summit also agreed that the role of the emerging economies (at 
least the largest ones) within the IMF and the World Bank would be expanded through agreement to 
increase their quota shares.  Membership in the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was enlarged to include 
the most prominent developing economies; its role was simultaneously elevated to match the elevated 
importance of regulatory reform on the global agenda. 
In other areas of global economic governance, the economic crisis produced less innovation and more 
concerns over backsliding in national policies.  Particularly in the trade regime, the economic downturn 
produced increased protectionism, as recessions had in the past.  Those measures were largely directed 
against China, the powerhouse of manufactured exports in the new global economy.iv
Although such trade policy measures ran counter to the G-20 pledges made in November 2008 and 
April 2009, their import should not be exaggerated.  None of the measures taken were outside either 
bilateral trade agreements or the existing international trade regime.  The WTO remained a secure 
bulwark against many forms of trade policy backsliding.  The sectors involved were, by and large, hardly 
central to global trade or to national economies:  these were “classic” cases of protectionism directed by 
import-competing sectors against their more competitive (and often state-guided) rivals.  Given the depths 
of the recession, protectionist complaints did not approach those that persisted throughout the 1980s in 
   Of particular 
concern to some, given the significance of their economic interdependence in several domains, were the 
measures taken by the United States against Chinese exports of low-cost tires and (prospectively) paper; 
steps countered by Chinese investigation of U. S. exports of chicken meat and automotive parts.  At the 
same time, the current round of trade negotiations under WTO auspices, the Doha Round, remained 
stalled, with little prospect of forward movement during the crisis. 
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such key sectors as automobiles or semiconductors.  Most governments were willing to deal with their 
commercial conflicts through the accepted dispute settlement procedures of the WTO. 
 
Explaining cooperation in the face of economic crisis 
Despite a thin layer of global governance--thinness that contributed to the onset of the  financial 
crisis—as well as sharp declines in exports and employment in most major economies, global governance 
and national policy cooperation have not weakened in the face of the crisis.  Although many questions 
remain regarding the commitments undertaken to rebalance global institutions and strengthen surveillance 
of national policies, outcomes so far suggest that crisis may produce strengthening and innovation in 
global governance.  At least four explanations can be offered for this positive outcome. 
a) The character of globalization in the early 21st
Although global economic integration may have promoted diffusion of the financial crisis, it has also 
shifted the incentives of national governments toward more cooperative responses, rendering economic 
nationalism and decoupling from the world economy less attractive.   
 century 
Consider once again the sectors that have been the initiators and targets of protectionist measures in 
trade conflict between the United States and China: low-cost tires, agricultural products, paper.  These are 
sectors in which international linkages and cross-border investments are relatively low:  the “nationality” 
of the sector or sub-sector is seldom in doubt.  Helen V. Milner (1988) has described the significance of 
cross-border investments in undermining protectionist pressures during earlier periods.  Perhaps the most 
significant feature of globalization over the two decades since Milner’s account has been the rapid growth 
in foreign direct investment, particularly to developing economies, and, within that group, to China.  As a 
leading Asian exporter of manufactured products, China has deviated sharply from the restrictive attitude 
toward foreign investment that was displayed by Japan and South Korea during their rapid 
industrialization. State-owned firms that partner with major U. S. and European multinationals, such as 
General Motors and Volkswagen, play a prominent role in the Chinese automobile industry, for example. 
Such cross-investment weakens potential protectionist coalitions in the industrialized countries, although 
labor remains opposed to any investments that result in re-export to the home economy.  The importance 
of foreign production based on cross-border investment was indicated in the recent measures taken against 
Chinese tire manufacturers:  no U.S. corporations joined the petition, which was initiated by a major U.S. 
labor union. 
In other rapidly growing sectors, such as consumer electronics, the process of production fragmentation 
or dis-integration has advanced, as production is parceled out among different economies and their 
producers.v  A recent analysis of the Apple iPod indicates that it contains key components manufactured 
by Japanese and South Korean corporations, with final assembly overseen elsewhere.  The iPods are then 
re-exported for distribution and sale around the world.vi
b) 
  Any protectionist disruption to this global supply 
chain is likely to harm producers of components (often politically influential multinationals in their own 
countries) as much or more than the manufacturer (assembler) of the final product.  Once again, potential 
protectionist coalitions face growing obstacles to their own assembly as a result of the new, cross-border 
models of manufacturing, and the prospects of damaging  (and self-defeating) retaliation in the event of 
protectionist measures serves as a barrier to increased trade barriers. 
International collaboration at the start of the Great Depression was undermined by an apparent conflict 
between the demands of the gold standard—the cooperative benchmark at that time—and domestic 
growth and employment.  As Barry Eichengreen has noted, the gold standard survived in the decades 
before 1914 in part because polities in the key economies were not fully democratic.  With the advent of 
universal adult suffrage in most industrial economies after World War I, demands grew for more 
Compensating losers:  global governance and domestic political demands 
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government intervention in the economy to ensure economic prosperity, even at the expense of the gold 
standard.   
International cooperation did not require such domestic political and economic sacrifice during the 
current economic crisis.  The Managing Director of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn was a vigorous 
proponent of expansionary national fiscal policies, a stance for which he was widely applauded.  The 
contrast with deflationary prescriptions of central bankers at the start of the Great Depression could not 
have been more stark.  The mechanisms of international cooperation, for the major industrialized 
economies and the large emerging economies, were geared toward preventing a complete financial 
collapse and deploying public sectors to compensate for a sharp decline in exports, investment, and 
private consumption.  International institutions supported such measures and provided accurate analysis of 
the course of economic developments (which lent further intellectual support to the national policy 
measures that were undertaken).   
In the realm of ideas, a shift in the global consensus, which had been underway since the Asian crisis, 
signaled an end to the so-called Washington Consensus.  Such a firm consensus on rolling back the public 
sector, reducing government intervention, and imposing fiscal and monetary austerity may never have 
existed (apart from its caricature by the critics of the Bretton Woods institutions).  Nevertheless, even the 
most stalwart of market-oriented economists, as well as their allies in the financial sector, fell into line 
with a new (and possibly temporary) international consensus on the necessity for government and central 
bank intervention that was unprecedented in scope.  The institutions and spokespersons of global 
governance were decidedly part of that shift in the policy consensus, and, in some cases, led the new 
thinking.  Whether the expedients adopted during the crisis will result in greater willingness to 
countenance public oversight and intervention in financial markets over the longer terms remains to be 
seen.  At the moment, the shift is pragmatic and crisis-driven; the ideological transition may not be as 
sturdy or longlasting as previous turns toward or away from market solutions. 
(c) 
Another force for stability in patterns of international cooperation is the altered circumstances of the 
major developing economies.  The economic periphery during the Great Depression led the world into 
economic crisis and bore the brunt of disruptions in world trade and financial flows.  With a few 
exceptions, those developing economies also led the world in decoupling from the international economy 
and embarking on import-substituting industrialization, domestic economic expansion, and debt default.  
The recession of the early 1980s produced the debt crisis of that decade, a “lost decade” for Latin 
American development.  Once again, developing economies suffered greater and more persistent 
economic distress than the industrialized economies. 
A more integrated and secure developing world 
In the current crisis, early hopes among developing economies that they might decouple from the 
industrialized world’s financial turmoil have been dashed, as steep declines in exports and financial 
disruption have spread throughout the global economy.  Nevertheless, the major developing economies 
have weathered the crisis better than many of the industrialized countries, suffering less steep declines in 
output and recovering more rapidly.  Their policy moves since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s 
are a partial explanation for this record.  By dealing with weaknesses in their financial systems in the 
aftermath of that crisis, some emerging economies, such as Brazil and Indonesia, have been able to 
withstand the recent financial shocks.  In other cases, such as India and China, very cautious financial 
opening and tight regulation (including direct state controls) prevented risky behavior before the crisis and 
enabled a rapid restarting of growth through credit expansion.   
The large emerging market economies were hardly immune from the global crisis, however, and their 
deeper integration into the international economy over the past two decades also gave them a strong 
interest in international collaboration designed to restore the global economy on a sustainable growth path.  
The enhanced role of the G-20 during the crisis was a clear sign of both their relatively strong economic 
performance and their willingness to participate in collaborative responses to the crisis.  Their 
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participation, however, required adjustment in the formulas of global governance, which had long been 
tilted toward the industrialized core of Japan, Europe, and North America. 
(d) 
A final explanation for the stability of international cooperation during the current crisis is a 
straightforward one:  if international cooperation is defined as policy adjustments (beyond those 
determined by purely domestic political considerations), the current crisis has seen very little international 
cooperation.  The major economies in particular undertook policy changes that were dictated by domestic 
political necessity:  further economic decline or financial collapse would have produced political costs 
that those elites were unwilling to contemplate.  The large fiscal stimulus implemented by the United 
States and China may have owed little to international pressure or collaboration.  Both countries had an 
interest in preventing fiscal free-riding by economies (such as those in Europe) that preferred less fiscal 
stimulus and more export recovery.  Even in the absence of a coordinated policy response, however, the 
United States and Chinese governments were likely to implement programs very similar to those that were 
mandated.  Central bank cooperation appears more important during the crisis, although the networked 
collaboration of central banks is more difficult to document.  Even in this domain, however, the 
unprecedented activism of the Federal Reserve (in contrast to the European Central Bank) owes far more 
to the explicit regulatory mandate of the U. S. central bank, as well as its implicit role in maintaining 
financial system stability.   
Successful non-cooperation? 
In supporting a strengthening of the IMF role and an expansion of its resources, one could also discern 
domestic political motivations.  The European Union’s insistence on financial cooperation was owed in 
part to the EU’s wish to avoid bailing out central and east European economies hard hit by the crisis.  A 
European political problem was promoted to the global level to be dealt with by the IMF.  The pattern of 
cooperation was a familiar one, with IMF financial assistance offered to those economies on familiar 
terms.  No new adjustments of policy on the part of the major powers were required, apart from agreement 
to provide additional resources for the IMF. 
For their own, primarily domestic, reasons each of the major economic powers had reason to 
implement policies that warded off financial collapse or economic depression.  The degree of formal (and 
specifically new) cooperation that was undertaken has been limited.    As they have since the end of the 
Cold War, the major powers once again were successful in sustaining negative order:  avoiding the worst, 
either a great power war or, its rough equivalent in the realm of the international economy, levels of 
economic conflict that result in mutual closure and a much lower level of global economic welfare.  The 
true test of international cooperation arrives in the next phase, however:  can national governments 
construct a new positive order:  substantive cooperation to achieve mutually desirable goals through joint 
action.  The latter will require more painful adjustments of policy that may face more potent domestic 
resistance as memories of the crisis fade.vii
 
  Paradoxically, the very elements of the international setting 
that produced the current, minimalist level of cooperation may serve as barriers to such more substantial 
cooperation in order to reconstruct sustainable growth and prevent future crises of this magnitude. 
Global governance after the crisis:  shortcomings and obstacles to reform 
Each of these partial explanations for the beneficial maintenance of global cooperation during the 
economic crisis points to a shortcoming in current global governance that future reforms must address.  If 
the current tenuous hold of international cooperation is to persist and strengthen, these obstacles must be 
overcome. 
(a) 
A more globalized economy has produced incentives for national elites to restrain impulses toward 
economic nationalism and unilateralism.  Globalization has made the foundation of existing global 
governance institutions more secure, in the sense that there are few incentives to depart from existing 
National policy spillovers in a globalized economy:  the need for international surveillance 
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international regimes.  At the same time, the latest economic crisis demonstrates that a more integrated 
international economy increases the spillover effects from policy missteps, particularly those made by the 
major economic powers.  American regulatory failures and Chinese exchange rate policies are only two 
examples of policies regarded (by these governments) as domestic that have had large international effects. 
These negative effects point to a longstanding need for closer and more intrusive international 
surveillance of national policies.   The IMF plays a central role in recommendations for expanded 
surveillance.  For example, the Manuel Commission (2009) advocated an expansion of the IMF 
surveillance mandate beyond exchange rates to “macroeconomic policies, prudential issues and financial 
spillovers.”  The Pittsburgh Summit of the G-20 also appeared to endorse an important role for both the 
IMF and peer pressure in the new Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth (FSSBG).  
The IMF is tasked to build on its existing surveillance activities in order to provide “candid, even-handed, 
and balanced analysis” of G-20 national policies, as well as estimates of whether G-20 policies are 
“collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories for the global economy. . . “viii
Unfortunately, little in the record of earlier surveillance, under IMF auspices or in other venues, 
suggests that the major national governments are willing to submit to serious multilateral surveillance of 
their economic policies.  The Financial Sector Assessment Plan (FSAP) was designed after the Asian 
financial crisis to assess financial sectors and lower the risk of future financial crises.  Neither the United 
States nor China has had such an assessment.  International oversight outside the FSAP did little to warn 
of the financial practices and conditions that led up to the current crisis.  (Lombardi 2009)  Post-crisis, 
governments have continued to guard their regulatory prerogatives; without substantial international 
prodding it is not clear that national political dynamics will produce the regulatory reforms required to 
secure financial stability.
 
ix  Surveillance of macroeconomic policies has been even less successful.  As 
Truman notes, the IMF surveillance record pre-crisis added credence to those who argued that the global 
institution had become irrelevant. x  The IMF’s Executive Board and Management indicated little 
willingness to confront the major economic powers over global economic imbalances.  When the IMF 
Managing Director finally instituted a process of multilateral consultation to address this issue, its 
“accomplishments fell far short of what was promised because of excessive timidity, unsound analysis. . . 
and lack of cooperation by the participants.”xi
(b) 
  Apart from a change in rhetorical tone, little in the global 
response to the crisis suggests that such resistance to international surveillance has diminished. 
Although institutions of global governance have not thwarted national efforts at economic revival, they 
have also failed to constrain national policies in the interests of agreed cooperative solutions.  During the 
economic crisis, coordination of national policies has been relatively easy, since most governments had 
strong incentives for activism and economic expansion.  Cooperation may become more difficult as 
governments contemplate their exit strategies from these crisis measures.  The new FSSBG has been 
criticized for an absence of “an effective enforcement mechanism.”
International constraints on national policy choices:  is surveillance enough? 
xii
Global institutions and norms that attempt to constrain national choices too narrowly will be 
overturned or ignores, just as the gold standard’s “golden fetters” were dissolved in the face of domestic 
pressure during the Great Depression.  Institutions that provide too many escape clauses and are too 
permissive of national policy choices will be ineffective in enforcing cooperative bargains.  Successful 
post-crisis reforms will require institutional innovations that manage to balance these competing demands. 
  On the key question of regulatory 
reform, resolving the issue of subsidiarity—how governance should be divided between the global and 
national levels--is even more pressing.  Different regulatory models can been defended on the grounds 
better fit with national political institutions and financial sectors.  Diversity in national policies also allows 
for experimentation and eventual diffusion of best national practices.  Such benefits, however, are 
dependent on satisfactory regulatory outcomes:  the prevention of excessive risk-taking and attention to 
the safety and soundness of the financial sector.   
(c) The developing world as principals in global governance 
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Perhaps the most dramatic innovation in global governance in the wake of the global economic crisis—
and likely to be its most persistent—is expansion of the influence of key developing economies in core 
global institutions.  The award of a central role to the G-20 in global economic discussions is one of 
several shifts that signal recognition of the engagement and economic weight of new players such as 
China, India, and Brazil.  Although inclusion and its addition to the legitimacy of global governance has 
carried the argument so far, the definition of inclusion and its costs have not been carefully evaluated.  
Legitimacy may require greater attention to the fragmented sovereignty that has characterized the 
globalized world.  Although the G-20 represents a large share of world population and an even larger 
share of world economic product, its membership simply reconfigures global institutions based on size.  
Inclusiveness may also be measured by the award of greater influence to the numerous smaller sovereign 
units, through innovations such as the double majority system of voting.xiii
Even if an appropriate formula can be agreed for enhancing legitimacy through greater inclusion in 
decision-making, that avenue to legitimacy must be weighed against the effectiveness of the institutions of 
global governance.  The risk that accompanies a proliferation of principals in any reform of global 
governance is institutional paralysis and a sharp decline in effectiveness.  Such a decline would in turn 
undermine legitimacy and encourage members to seek alternative forums for their deliberations.  (Such 
exit by prominent members—tacitly if not formally—has often produced clubs of powerful countries 
operating outside the purview of large-membership organizations.) 
   
Inclusion also presents a third dilemma:  an award of influence to such emerging powers as India and 
China entails greater voice for countries that have been most resistant to international surveillance of 
national policies.  The large developing countries (and many smaller ones) have uniformly adopted a 
“hard” stance on sovereignty; non-interference in domestic affairs has been their watchword.  If a 
globalized economy requires greater scrutiny of national economic policies by international institutions or 
peer governments, these countries are likely to be the most skeptical of such an agenda. 
(d) 
The global economic crisis has produced limited institutional innovation:  the G-20 has been elevated, 
along with the Financial Stability Board (labeled the “fourth pillar” of global governance by U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner); the IMF has been refurbished and awarded new resources as well 
as an old-new role in surveillance.  The language of “pillars” suggests a centralization of global 
governance and its concentration on a handful of key intergovernmental institutions.  In this regard, the 
rhetoric of institutional reform echoes the arguments of those who advocate concentrating more authority 
in fewer, more accountable institutions.
Institutional fragmentation and coordination 
xiv
 
  This tidy vision confronts a theoretical and a practical 
challenge.  The theoretical challenge comes from the virtues of institutional variety and competition.  
Formal intergovernmental institutions are only one model of international order:  informal networks have 
also demonstrated their effectiveness, as the network of central bankers, centered on the Bank for 
International Settlements, has repeatedly demonstrated.  In practical terms, centralization will face 
political resistance from those with interests in other parts of the fragmented pattern of global governance.  
Centralization also involves the creation of mechanisms for coordination, between the IMF and the FSB, 
for example, on regulatory issues. 
Conclusion:  economic crisis and global governance 
In contrast to earlier financial crises and steep economic downturns, the current global economic crisis 
has produced a modest strengthening of existing institutions, a rebalancing (also modest) of their internal 
formulas for influence, and a pledges (and only pledges at present) to undertake ambitious cooperative 
ventures in policy coordination and surveillance and financial regulation.  The world that produced these 
encouraging “green shoots” of international economic collaboration differs substantially from the world 
economic environments that produced earlier declines in cooperation and in the institutions that embodied 
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that cooperation.  It is a world more integrated economically, but also integrated in different ways and a 
world in which the club of industrialized countries is conceding its dominance of global policy.  Those 
same features of the new international environment, however, add caution to any predictions that these 
crisis-induced initiatives will become the long-delayed deepening of global governance to match a more 
integrated and more vulnerable world economy. 
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